(vid) Δ Παπαδημητρίου ( νέος Υπ Οικονομίας ): “Με αυτήν την κυβέρνηση, παράλληλο νόμισμα, δεν θα υπάρξει ποτέ …”

2 σχόλια στο “(vid) Δ Παπαδημητρίου ( νέος Υπ Οικονομίας ): “Με αυτήν την κυβέρνηση, παράλληλο νόμισμα, δεν θα υπάρξει ποτέ …””

1. Λυπάμαι τελικά η πολιτική είναι πολύ σκληρή για μένα

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2. Απορώ γιατί υπάρχει ΟΜΕΡΤΑ για το “σενάριο” εισαγωγής του Geuro (στο 10% στους μισθούς Δ.Υ και 5% στις συντάξεις) για να προσληφθούν σταδιακά (25,000 χιλ/3μηνο)!
   Levy Economics Institute of Bard College Strategic Analysis September 2016 GREECE: GETTING OUT OF THE RECESSION
   DIMITRI B. PAPADIMITRIOU, MICHALIS NIKIFOROS and GENNARO ZEZZA
   Scenario 2: Creating Jobs with a Fiscal Currency In our second and final scenario, we update our analysis of the possible impact of a fiscal expansion financed through the introduction of a fiscal currency, the Geuro, that the government can start issuing to avoid the fall in nominal wages and pensions, and to finance an employment program. This scenario is built on top of our previous scenario—that is, we are assuming a fiscal boost in addition to the increase in public investment projected in scenario 1. We assume that, starting in the first quarter of 2017, the government will issue a nonconvertible “fiscal currency” along the lines discussed in our previous reports (Papadimitriou, Nikiforos, and Zezza 2014, 2015, 2016).What we have in mind is similar to the complementary currency that has been operating very successfully in Switzerland alongside the Swiss franc since 1934, when it was introduced to offset restrictive fiscal policy (Papadimitriou 2016). Source: Authors’ calculations Billions of 2010 Euros 160 200 220 240 260 Baseline Scenario Scenario 1 (public investment) Scenario 2 (Geuro jobs program) Figure 11 Greece: Real GDP under Alternative Scenarios 2006 2008 2014 2010 2012 2016 2018 180 Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 11 To calibrate the projections, we use the same parameters adopted in our report of January 2016, although we adjust the volumes to match the most recent data on government outlays and revenues.We propose that the government allow the use of Geuros for up to 20 percent of tax payments. In the last year for which data are available (from 2015Q2 to 2016Q1), government revenues from “Taxes on production and imports” were €28.7 billion, “Taxes on income and wealth” an additional €17 billion, and “Social contributions” €24.8 billion, for a total of €70.5 billion. This implies that annual demand for Geuros for tax purposes alone could be equivalent to €14.1 billion. The main purpose for the introduction of the Geuro would be the gradual implementation of a program of public benefit work, where new jobs are provided to anyone willing to work for a minimum wage, set at a level that is noncompetitive with employment in the private sector yet sufficient for obtaining a decent standard of living. Our estimates are obtained from Antonopoulos et al. (2014) and based on an assumed monthly gross wage of €586,with an annual gross expenditure of €7.5 billion for 550,000 workers, including all other expenses (intermediate products, social contributions, etc.). We propose to pay for these public benefit jobs in both euros and Geuros. Adopting a proportion of 50 percent, this implies an additional annual expenditure in euros of 3.8 billion, which can be financed by paying 10 percent of public sector wages in Geuros (for an estimated annual outlay of €2.1 billion) and 5 percent of pensions and other social benefits in Geuros (an estimated €1.7 billion annually). Adopting these measures, net government payments in euros would decrease by roughly 3.9 billion, while the Geuros issued to fill the gap in financing the public benefit jobs program would amount to €3.6 billion—well below the expected demand arising from the option of using Geuros for tax payments. We therefore assume that the additional government expenditure can be financed using Geuros, for a maximum of €2 billion per quarter from the beginning of 2017 to the end of our projection period. Since it isn’t feasible to put such a large-scale employment program in place immediately, we assume that the size of the public benefit jobs program will increase incrementally by 25,000 people each quarter, for an overall increase in employment of 200,000 by the end of the projection period. This implies a much smaller expenditure in Geuros than what is feasible, so we also assume that additional public investment is financed through Geuro emission, at 800 million per year, and that pension payments are increased by 10 percent, for an additional expenditure of about 3.2 billion per year. We have simulated this scenario using our macroeconomic model, with the results reported in Table 3. Using the assumptions above, the model shows that the additional expenditure in Geuros would be well below the amount in Geuros that could be used for tax payments; or, to put it differently, that the potential demand for Geuros for tax purposes would largely exceed the supply, so there is no reason to fear any inflationary pressures arising from Geuro emission. This argument applies for those who believe that an increase in the money supply generates a proportional increase in the price level: should this theory be realistic— which we doubt—our calculations show that the end-of-theyear increase in the money supply would be negligible. On the contrary, if the fiscal expansion financed through Geuro emission were unable to increase the domestic supply of both capital and consumption goods—due to the wreckage of the Greek industrial base caused by the prolonged recession—our results would be optimistic, and the impact on imports could be greater. This possible outcome could be alleviated by directing at least part of the fiscal expansion toward strengthening
   Table 3 Greece: Key Indicators under Alternative Scenarios 12 Strategic Analysis, September 2016
   Scenario 2: Geuro jobs program
   Real GDP (growth rate) -0.3 -0.4 +5.2 +3.7
   Gov. euro total surplus (% of GDP) -1.9 -0.7 +0.8 +1.9
   Gov. euro primary surplus (% of GDP) -3.4 +2.6 +4.0 +5.0
   Gov. Geuro surplus (% of GDP) 0.0 0.0 -1.3 -1.6
   Current account (% of GDP) -0.8 -2.1 -0.8 -0.1
   the productive capacity of Greek firms or encouraging the creation of new businesses. As reported in Table 3, a Geuro plan like the one described above would not jeopardize current targets in terms of the government primary surplus in euros, nor would it bring about a significant deficit in the current account. There is reason to believe that the introduction of the Geuro would have a smaller impact on imports relative to a fiscal stimulus of the same size in euros. However, we have not introduced any arbitrary assumptions about the elasticity of imports to expenditure in Geuros, and therefore our projections for the current account (Table 3) may be pessimistic in that respect. If this is correct, an even bolder plan could be put in place for creating jobs financed via the complementary currency, as long as the flow of net new liquidity did not grow faster than the additional domestic output generated by the stimulus. Conclusion The Greek government is fulfilling most of the conditions— increasing taxes and reducing public pensions and other expenditures—imposed by its international lenders as agreed in the third MOU. The Eurogroup will most likely approve the disbursement of the second installment of €2.8 billion at its meeting in October. As reported in the Greek media, recent voices have echoed Berlin’s intention to delay negotiations for debt relief despite the promise made by European leaders last year to do so once the conditions were met (and of which the government is so proud). On the positive side, Greek bonds may finally be included in the European Central Bank’s quantitative easing policy. Our contention in this report is that 2016 is unlikely to end with improvement in the Greek economy’s GDP growth rate, despite the government’s pronouncements. Our simulations show, however, that if the arrears accounts are cleaned up and an increase in investment occurs, the government’s projection of 2.7 percent GDP growth in 2017 may come to pass. This is not, of course, a cause for celebration, since employment will not increase dramatically. Our second scenario, however, could provide robust growth from 2017 onward, together with very significant gains in employment. It has worked in other countries, and it can work in Greece.

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